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Abstract ― The institutions for adjudicating employment rights in Great Britain and 
Sweden are superficially similar – in both countries there are labour courts with lay 
judges and both countries are covered by European Union employment legislation. 
Beneath this surface, however, there are important differences. In Sweden there is 
collective regulation as the social partners ( that is trade unions and employers 
organisations) continue to play a significant part in the labour court process. In 
contrast the social partners no longer play a role in the adjudication of employment 
rights in Great Britain, which provides an individualistic, self-service model. This 
article traces these changes in Great Britain, and the lack of them in Sweden, before 
offering theoretical explanations for the differences. 
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Labour Courts in Great Britain and Sweden:  
a self-service model v. collective regulation 
 
 
In the last 40 years in Europe, protection at work has come to rest increasingly on individual 
legal rights, partly because of national policy and part because of the European Union’s 
social dimension. As a result, the institutions for adjudicating these individual legal 
employment rights have become increasingly salient. This paper looks at these adjudicatory 
institutions in two countries: Great Britain and Sweden and draws cross-national comparisons 
and explanations for divergence. It argues that although there are superficial similarities, for 
instance in both countries there are labour courts i.e. specialised institutions which adjudicate 
disputes between the individual worker and his/her employer, the differences are significant. 
In Sweden the social partners, that is trade unions and employer organisations, continue to 
play an important part in the adjudication process, including the nomination of lay judges and 
controlling access to the Labour Court. In Great Britain in contrast, the social partners now 
play virtually no part as a result of a series of changes. It is for individuals to put themselves 
forward as lay judges and to bring claims to the labour court and to mount appeals.  
For convenience this paper mainly uses the generic terms ‘labour court’, and ‘lay judges’, 
although sometimes we use the local name. This paper also focuses on Great Britain, not the 
UK, as Northern Ireland’s arrangements differ slightly from those elsewhere in the UK, i.e. 
England, Wales and Scotland. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: first some relevant theoretical frameworks and the 
methodology are outlined, as well as the origins of the labour courts in Great Britain and 
Sweden. Then this paper considers the differences between the two countries today in the 
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way lay judges are selected, in the gateways before use can be made of the labour court, 
hearings at the labour court and appeals. Next the paper discusses which system is more 
effective, adopting a number of criteria as effectiveness is a contested term and raises the 
question, for whom it is effective. Finally we offer a theoretical explanation of the differences 
based on path dependency theory.  
Theoretical frameworks 
As noted briefly above and as will be demonstrated in detail below, there are significant 
differences in the employment adjudicatory systems in Great Britain and Sweden and there 
are a number of typologies which could provide a theoretical explanation.  One explanation is 
the legal origin hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that national regulatory approaches are 
significantly influenced by whether a country belongs to one of the ‘principal legal families’ 
(Deakin et al., 2007: 133): civil law as in Sweden, or common law as in Great Britain. 
Initially the legal origin hypothesis was applied to corporate governance and finance, but it 
was then applied to labour law by Botero et al., (2004), who looked at labour laws in 85 
countries using three theories of institutional choice: efficient adaptation of institutions to 
change, political power theories (in this context the political power of labour), and legal 
origin. The strongest determinant was found to be legal origin.  The author, however, is not 
aware of any research applying the legal origins hypothesis to labour law adjudication. 
Nevertheless, legal origin provides a possible explanation of the differences in Swedish and 
British labour courts. 
Another explanation is the varieties of capitalism thesis. This contends that firm strategies are 
shaped by the range of institutional opportunities and constraints for resolving coordination 
problems, leading to ‘complementarities’ between industrial relations arrangements, 
vocational training, corporate governance, and employer and employee associations. This 
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results in two broad economic models: coordinated market economies such as Sweden, where 
coordination problems are resolved by non-market methods; and liberal market economies 
such as Great Britain, where these problems are resolved through competitive and contract-
based inter-firm relations. See Hall and Soskice (2001); Hancke (2009).Again the varieties of 
capitalism thesis provides a possible explanation of the differences between Swedish and 
British labour courts. 
These explanations, however, are essentially static, unlike path dependency. To crudely 
summarise path dependency theory, what has happened in the past determines what happens 
in the future and initial differences persist. This is because ‘in any given institutional system, 
previous steps in a particular direction induce further movements in the same direction’ 
(Erhel and Zajdela, 2004). There can be deviation from a path, however, in the face of an 
exogenous shock. Expanding on this Mahoney (2000) outlines mechanisms for change: 
functional – a response to an exogenous shock, power – a response to the weakening of elites, 
and legitimation – a response to a change in values. Streek and Thelen (2005), however, 
argue that exogenous shocks, such as war and revolution, have not been a feature of the past 
50 years in western Europe and institutions evolve. ‘[W]e are struck, simultaneously by how 
little and how much they have changed over time’ (Thelen, 2003:11). In a similar vein, 
Teague (2009) distinguishes between hard path dependency as a result of an exogenous shock 
and soft path dependency. The hard version of path dependency is too rigid to explain gradual 
change, unlike soft path dependency, which he argues may occur because of endogenous 
factors such as a decline in trade union power.  
This seems to reify change and as Crouch and Farrell (2004), agency should be taken into 
account. Accordingly, they maintain that ‘actors may adapt institutions in a given 
environment’ but only where alternatives exist somewhere within agents’ repertoire, for 
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instance an adjacent field (Crouch and Farrell, 2004:15, 20).  This paper will revisit these 
theories. 
Methodology 
The two countries studied have been chosen because on the face of it they have many 
similarities: both are in Western Europe and both are unitary, not federalist states; both are 
members of the European Union and are thus subject to European Union employment 
legislation which is extensive covering, for instance, hours, holidays, maternity leave, health 
and safety, consultation with worker representatives and discrimination with the protected 
characteristics being gender, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, age and religion or 
belief. In addition in both countries there is additional domestic legislation including 
legislation on unfair dismissal.  
Moreover, in both countries, claims based on employment law do not go to the ordinary 
courts, as they do in Italy, Portugal and Spain for instance. They go to specialised institutions: 
labour courts. Moreover, not only do both countries have labour courts, they also have both 
professional judges and two panels of lay judges, one panel representing employers and one 
panel representing employees. 
This paper is primarily based on desk research drawing on official materials, statutes, 
handbooks, and legal commentaries. In addition, face-to-face interviews were held with 10 
stakeholders in Sweden (professional and lay judges, lawyers and public officials). In Great 
Britain, this paper builds on survey data and nine exploratory interviews as part of a previous 
research study
1
. Interviews lasted on average an hour and were recorded and transcribed. 
Additionally the author has extensive experience as both a participant (lay judge) and 
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observer of Great Britain’s first instance and second instance labour courts. The interview 
material was mainly used to elucidate and clarify institutional practice in order to allow for 
institutional comparison, which is the main focus in this paper.  Further research is needed on 
the practice of key actors. 
Origins and background 
Until the 1970s the law in Great Britain was used only in exceptional circumstances in the 
employment sphere and the rights and interests of British workers were protected by trade 
unions and the collective agreements which they had concluded with employers (Kahn-
Freund, 1977). In the last four decades, however, there has been a significant decrease in 
trade union density and coverage of the workforce by collective agreements has waned. For 
instance average trade union density was 47 per cent in the 1970s, but in 2011 it was 25 per 
cent with collective bargaining coverage standing at 31 per cent in 2011 (Brownlie, 2012).  
Concomitant with this decline there has been a growth in individual statutory rights in Britain 
mainly, but by no means wholly, emanating from the European Union. As a result, British 
employment relations, which half a century ago were voluntarist and collective, are now 
subject to legal adjudication mainly, but not exclusively, by labour courts known as 
employment tribunals, (ETs). 
ETs were set up under the Industrial Training Act 1964, essentially as administrative 
tribunals dealing with individual disputes in the employment sphere between a party versus 
the state, for instance to adjudicate on appeals by employers in respect of the imposition of 
training levies. Nevertheless, although they were never the creatures of collectivism, unlike 
Sweden – see below, they were established in the heyday of corporatism, so they were 
constituted on a tripartite basis. Each court was composed of a legally qualified judge and 
two lay people, one representing employers and one representing employees (Dickens et al, 
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1985; Meeran, 2006). In 1971 a new individual employment right was enacted, unfair 
dismissal. Accordingly the government used existing institutions, ETs, to expand their remit 
to party versus party disputes. Then after this, when new employment legislation was 
adopted, ETs were the bodies charged with further party v. party adjudication. 
 
The Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) is much older than Britain’s employment 
tribunals. It was created in 1929 and its primary task was to deal with disputes on the 
interpretation and application of collective agreements covering manual workers and disputes 
relating to the no-strike requirements of the 1928 Collective Agreements Act. Accordingly it 
was a creature of collectivism. In 1947 collective agreements covering salaried private sector 
employees were brought within the Labour Court’s scope and from 1966 public sector 
employees, like their private sector counterparts, came within the scope of the Labour Court.  
When in 1974 the Swedish government began to introduce individual employment rights 
legislation, like its British counterpart it decided to adapt an existing institution. Accordingly, 
the remit of the Labour Court was widened in 1974 to cover virtually all aspects of 
employment law relating to individual rights. When new employment legislation was 
adopted, the Labour Court was charged with further party v party adjudication 
(Arbetsdomstolen, n.d.). 
 
Nevertheless, several matters which are regulated by statute in Great Britain remain regulated 
by collective agreement in Sweden, not law, such as redundancy payments and a minimum 
wage (Woolfson et al, 2010). Moreover, despite the increasing amount of individual 
employment rights legislation, trade union density in Sweden has remained high compared to 
Great Britain, and any decline has been slight. In the 1970s average trade union density in 
Sweden was 73 per cent and in 2011 it had only slightly dropped to 68 per cent. Furthermore, 
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85 per cent of companies are members of employers’ organisations; collective bargaining 
coverage equates to 90 per cent of employees (European Commission, 2011; Scheuer, 2011); 
there are some 60 unions and 50 employers’ associations and they negotiate some 600 
collective agreements (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, 2009). 
 
Despite these industrial relations and institutional differences, which we depict more fully 
below, both countries have much in common. Both are subject to European Union law. Both 
are subject to the zeitgeist of neo-liberalism and, although both countries are outside the euro, 
they are not immune to the financial upheavals affecting the euro and the US dollar since 
2009.  
Lay judges 
As noted above, in both countries there are lay judges in the labour courts. Their role is to 
provide workplace/employment relations experience to supplement the legal knowledge of 
the professional judges.  The lay judges are separated into two panels, reflecting the two sides 
of industry, but there the similarity ends. In Sweden, statute sets out how many lay judges can 
be put forward by each trade union confederation and employers’ organisation as follows:  
Table 1: Lay judges and nominating bodies 
Number of  
lay judges 
Organisation  
4 Confederation of Swedish Enterprises 
1 Association of Local Authorities 
1 Federation of County Councils 
4 Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
2 Confederation of Professional Employees 
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1 Confederation of Professional Associations 
1 Appointed by Ministry as representative of 
State as employer 
 
In theory each nominating body ‘recommends’ its nominees to the Ministry, which then has 
to approve the nominations and only appoints after approval. In practice, the Ministry never 
challenges these recommendations.  Moreover, in addition each nominating organisation also 
recommends three stand-ins for each substantive lay judge and again the Ministry never 
challenges these. As a result, the labour market actors are in control. 
In marked contrast to Sweden, Britain’s social partners have not played a part in the selection 
of lay judges to Great Britain’s labour courts for over a decade. In 1999, the British 
government decided that lay judges should be selected and appointed in accordance with the 
procedures that had been introduced for public appointments generally, which are based on 
the principles of transparency and appointment on the basis of merit that had been 
adumbrated by Nolan (1995). Accordingly there are advertisements for British lay judges 
who self-nominate, fill in an application form and are then assessed by formal selection 
processes which draw on a conventional human resources repertoire (competency 
frameworks, job requirements, person specification, formal tests) overseen by the Judicial 
Appointments Commission but outsourced to human resources consultants who are assisted 
by professional judges (Department of Trade, 2003). (This is not to say that self-nomination 
does not take place in Sweden, but it is typically behind an institutional veil, through internal 
search or self-promotion, and individuals do not submit applications directly to appointing 
authorities.) 
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Somewhat paradoxically, however, although in Great Britain (unlike Sweden) worker and 
employer organisations do not play a part in the nomination and selection of lay judges, 
tripartism has not been totally obliterated. There are still two panels: employer and employee 
to which individuals self-nominate. This has occasionally led to individuals who are union 
members but whose job is as a manager nominating themselves to the employee panel 
(Department of Trade, 2003). Furthermore, at the final stage of the lay judge appointment 
process the Minister is required by law to consult with organisations representative of 
employers and employees, although in practice this is a formality.
2
 There is no such 
consultation, however, when British lay judges are reappointed after their three year term, a 
reappointment that is virtually automatic until the age of 70.  
Composition 
The Swedish Labour Court is generally composed of seven people. There are three neutrals: 
two professional judges and a labour market expert. The professional judges are career 
judges, who begin their careers as so-called secretaries (apprentice judges) before becoming 
judges. There are four lay judges: two from the employer side and two from the employee 
side.  
In discrimination cases, this composition can (not must) be changed: the same three neutrals, 
but only one employer judge and one employee judge. The rationale is that the employer side 
and the employee side members have a mutual interest in defending their agreements and 
thus preserving the status quo at the workplace to the detriment of those from a minority 
group and thus the neutral members in discrimination cases should be able to outvote the 
employer/employee members. This provision was brought in from 1.1.2009 after the then 
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 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, reg. 8. 
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gender equality ombudsman lost many cases on wage discrimination to the consternation of 
female Members of the Swedish Parliament. 
In Great Britain today most cases are adjudicated by a single professional judge, who has 
formerly been a lawyer (solicitor or barrister of at least seven years’ standing). This is 
because since 1993 the Government step-by step has been eroding the jurisdictions where the 
two lay judges (one from each side) sit with the single professional judge, with the latest 
change (April 2012) allowing the professional judge to sit alone in unfair dismissal cases 
which comprised a quarter of all claims in 2011-12 (Ministry of Justice, 2012a). Now 
essentially in every jurisdiction except discrimination (which comprise about a third of all 
cases (Ministry of Justice, 2012a)), the default position is that the professional judge sits 
alone; for instance the professional judge can sit alone in unfair 
dismissal/hours/holidays/minimum wage/redundancy cases.  The professional judge, 
however, can exercise discretion and depart from the default position and sit with lay judges 
(one from each side) after having regard to certain matters, for instance the views of the 
parties, whether there is a likelihood that there will be a dispute on the facts which makes it 
desirable for the proceedings to heard by a full tribunal. In summary then, essentially apart 
from discrimination, it is for the professional judge to decide the labour court’s composition 
against the background of the default position. 
 
Even where lay judges sit in Great Britain, their status is less than that of their counterparts in 
Sweden. Although British lay judges are required to swear the judicial oath they are not 
officially called lay judges. Instead they are called lay members or wing members (implying 
that their position is not central) or non-legal members, the latter term defining them 
according to what they do not possess, rather than what they do possess.   Such equivalent 
terminology is not used in Sweden. Second, while in Sweden lay judges are required to sign 
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the judgment, in Great Britain only the professional judge signs the judgment and British lay 
judges are merely required to give tacit approval. Indeed the professional judge often also 
writes a lay member’s dissent in the very rare cases (less than five per cent) where there is 
dissent (Selwyn, 2008). 
Gateways 
In Sweden, before a claim even gets to the Labour Court there is much involvement by the 
social partners. Wwhen a labour dispute arises and if the worker is a member of the union and 
covered by a collective agreement (and as noted above most Swedish workers are) there are 
initially formal local negotiations between the most senior workplace manager and the local 
union representative. These negotiations may involve several meetings and most issues are 
settled locally, providing a significant filter. Similarly, there are local negotiations if the 
employer is a member of an employer’s association and/or is covered by a collective 
agreement. 
If there is no resolution, the next stage is central negotiations between the trade union official 
and the employers’ association official. These negotiations are more formal, often with the 
parties’ lawyers providing advice according to interviewees, and most cases which reach this 
stage are settled, so providing a further filter. Only if there is a failure to settle at this stage 
does the case go to the Labour Court. 
Discrimination cases can be different as a worker can complain to the Discrimination 
Ombudsman
3
 (DO), and there were 700 complaints in 2011 to the DO that were related to 
employment. If it is an employment matter, the DO advises the worker to approach his/her 
union. If the worker is not a union member, however, or if the union does not wish to take the 
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The Discrimination Ombudsman (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen) is the title of both a person and 
the organisation headed by that person. 
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complaint further, the DO will investigate. After investigation, it takes no further action in the 
vast majority of cases. For instance in 2011 it settled 23 cases and brought seven to the 
Labour Court, less than 2 per cent of all cases lodged.
4
 
In Great Britain, there is no provision for the involvement of the social partners at any stage. 
Only after an individual worker has lodged a claim with the labour court and the employer 
has responded, does a government funded body, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (Acas) step in and offer to conciliate. It was successful in a third of cases in 2011-12 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012a). 
This post-claim conciliation by Acas, which dates back to 1975, is to be supplemented by 
’early conciliation’ in 2014. Claimants will be required to submit the details of their claim to 
Acas in the first instance and will then be offered the option of conciliation. If they, or the 
respondents, do not wish to attempt conciliation or if conciliation is unsuccessful after 
normally a one month period, the individual can then lodge a claim with the labour court 
(BIS/HM Courts & Tribunals Service, 2011).  
Up to now claimants in Great Britain and Sweden have to pay no fee to access the labour 
court but this has recently changed in Great Britain in 2013. The fee structure is complex, but 
for most cases the so-called issue fee is £250 (approximately €292) (Ministry of Justice, 
2012b). A system of remission in respect of these fees has been devised, essentially providing 
that no fees will be payable if the claimant’s annual income is below a certain level or if 
certain state benefits are received, but this system is not generous. See the Statutory 
Instrument for more details.
5
  
Hearings 
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 Interview with DO 
5 See www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111538654‎ UK Statutory Instrument: The 
Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013 No. 1893. 
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In Great Britain any worker (not employer) can lodge a claim with the labour court. To have 
a hearing, however, claimants in 2013 will have to pay a further fee of either £230 
(approximately €269) or £950 (approximately €1,111), depending on the type of complaint, 
in addition to the issue fee noted above (Ministry of Justice, 2012b).  
There is no legal aid. In the 1960s the unions wanted claimants to rely on their union and at 
that time union density was almost double what it is today; government did not want to place 
a burden on the public purse; and it was not in the interests of employers that there should be 
financial assistance for workers. As a quid pro quo however, first there are no restrictions on 
representation. Both claimant and respondent can be represented by, for instance, a friend, a 
spouse, a union official or a human resources consultant, as well as self-representation or 
representation by a lawyer. A survey in 2008 found that almost two thirds of both claimants 
and respondents had legal representation at a hearing (Peters, et al, 2010). Second, costs do 
not follow the event. In only a very few cases (less than 0.1 per cent) does the ET require the 
losing party to pay the winning party’s costs, for instance because a party has acted abusively 
or if the bringing or conduct of the proceedings were ‘misconceived’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2012a). 
Hearings at the Swedish Labour Court are very different. The most important difference is 
that the worker cannot initiate claims and a worker does not decide whether or not to make a 
claim. A claim has to be made on a worker’s behalf by a trade union or the Discrimination 
Ombudsman. A trade union can (not must) bring a claim on behalf of a worker if the worker 
is a member of the trade union and covered by a relevant collective agreement. The 
Discrimination Ombudsman (DO) can bring a case to the Labour Court on behalf of a worker 
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if the case concerns an employment matter, whether or not the worker is a trade union 
member and/or covered by a collective agreement, but again the choice is not the worker’s.6 
As to employers and their associations, an employers’ association may bring a claim in its 
own right or on behalf of an employer who is a member of that association either in relation 
to a sectoral agreement or in relation to a single-employer agreement: this could deal with a 
collective matter, such as the timing of industrial action, or an individual issue such as 
recovery of a worker’s wages because of inadvertent overpayment.  Similarly an employer 
who has a collective agreement can also bring a claim to the Labour Court.  
In short, control of access to the Labour Court is very much in the hands of the social 
partners. Where the worker is not represented by a union, or where an employer does not 
have a collective agreement/ is not a member of an employers’ association, claims have to be 
made to the ordinary civil (district) court. 
No statistics on the number of employment cases handled by the civil courts have been 
uncovered but anecdotal evidence suggests that the number is low as fees, and the fact that 
costs are normally awarded to the winner, serve to discourage putative claimants. In contrast, 
at the Labour Court there are no fees and the organisation bringing the case is normally 
legally represented. 
Appeals 
There is no appeal from a decision of the Swedish Labour Court, so social partner control is 
not undermined at a later stage. In addition if an employment case has originated in the civil 
courts, appeal is to the Labour Court and can be made on fact or law. The decision as to 
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the District Court. 
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whether to allow an appeal in full or in part is taken by three professional Labour Court 
judges who have perused the papers, the appellant’s submissions, the District Court’s 
judgment and, as the District Court’s hearing has been videoed from start to finish, they 
sometimes watch at least part of that video.Permission is granted in about a third of all cases 
with no reason given either for acceptance or rejection of an appeal.  
At such an appeal the Labour Court watches the video and thus rehears the case in the 
District Court completely, as well as hearing submissions from the parties’ representatives. 
As the Labour Court is normally composed of seven members (two professional judges plus 
the labour market expert and two employer side and two employee side members), the social 
partners are involved in having the final word.  
It almost goes without saying that Great Britain’s appellate system is very different. Appeals, 
which can only be made on a point of law, are taken first to the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(EAT). Until 2013 the EAT was tripartite, if the first instance hearing had been tripartite, 
(that is a professional judge and two lay judges, one representing employers and one 
representing employees).  The EAT lay judges self-nominate filling in an application form in 
response to an advertisement like their counterparts below, and the process of selection 
mirrors that for the ETs, so here too the social partners today play virtually no part. 
In 2013, however, lay judges were removed entirely from the EAT. As below, however, the 
professional judge can (and will continue to be able to) exercise discretion and depart from 
the default position and sit with lay judges, one from each side (BIS/HM Courts & Tribunals 
Service, 2011). 
Appeals on points of law in employment matters, however, do not stop at the EAT. If leave to 
appeal is granted, further appeals can be made to the Court of Appeal (Court of Session in 
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Scotland) and the Supreme Court. In these courts they professional judges do not specialise in 
employment; they are generalists and there are no lay judges at all. 
Relative merits 
Any consideration of the relative merits of these employment rights institutions is fraught 
with difficulty because such comparisons are taken out of context. Moreover, what is more 
effective is a contested term and what is deemed more effective than something else depends 
on the criterion adopted and the party for whom it is more effective. 
 
 The Royal Commission chaired by Lord Donovan (1968) were of the view that employment 
tribunals would be easily accessible, speedy, inexpensive and informal compared to Britain’s 
civil courts. These criteria will be adopted for comparing labour courts in Great Britain and 
Sweden, taking first the criterion of accessibility. The more accessible is a labour court, 
essentially the more effective it is for the person who seeks to enforce their employment 
rights and that person is typically a worker. Accessibility, however, has many aspects. One 
aspect is who can bring a claim. In Great Britain a worker can lodge a claim, if he/she so 
wishes. In Sweden, as we have seen, workers cannot do so. Whether or not a worker’s claim 
is lodged is the decision of the trade union or the Discrimination Ombudsman. A second 
aspect of accessibility is location. In Great Britain employment tribunals can be found in 26 
centres. In Sweden there is only one Labour Court in Stockholm, the Swedish capital.  
 
As to speed, and it is in the interests of both claimants and respondents, that is workers and 
employers, that disputes are adjudicated promptly. British labour courts are speedier than 
their Swedish counterpart. In the year from 1 April 2011, the average time taken from a claim 
being lodged at an Employment tribunal to a final decision was 32 weeks (Ministry of 
Justice, 2012a), compared to some 56 weeks in Sweden(Arbetsdomstolen, n.d.).However, if 
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one then considers the appellate process as well, the British system is much slower. It can 
take years for a worker in Britain to take the case upwards through all the appellate courts 
and finally obtain a decision from the Supreme Court, whereas the Swedish Labour Court’s 
decision is final. 
 
Another criterion revolves around the question of expense. British labour courts now charge a 
substantial fee to lodge a claim, like their Swedish counterpart. In Great Britain, however, 
that fee is paid by the claimant who is normally the worker. In Sweden it is paid on behalf of 
the claimant by the trade union, DO, or employers’ association.  
 
As to informality, it is probably in the interests of both parties, but not the lawyers’, to have 
informal, non-legalistic proceedings. In Great Britain lawyers have crept in. The number of 
British workers having legal representation has grown. In 1983 20 per cent of claimants and 
37 per cent of employers had legal representation (Dickens et al, 1985). In 2008, 62 per cent 
of claimants and employers had legal representation (Peters et al, 2010). Lawyers are both a 
reflection of formality and add to it. (For other symptoms of the growth of formality see 
Corby and Latreille, 2012). Sweden’s Labour Court has never scored highly on informality 
and the organisations that act on behalf of the individuals are virtually always legally 
represented. 
 
Another criterion that could be adopted is whether there is procedural justice and the 
judgments are seen as legitimate by the parties. A survey in Britain found that three-fifths of 
claimants (59 per cent) said they were satisfied with the outcome of their case, but there was 
a significant difference between those who had won and those who had lost their case (76 per 
cent compared to 29 per cent), suggesting that it is hard to disentangle satisfaction with the 
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outcome from satisfaction with the process. The same survey also found that satisfaction 
among British employers was related to a successful outcome. (Peters et al. 2010). 
There is some evidence that a decision is seen as more legitimate where it is made by more 
than one person enabling differing perspectives to be brought to bear. As noted above, a case 
is heard in Sweden’s Labour Court by at least five judges and normally seven; not only 
professional judges, but also lay judges with knowledge of the world of work and a labour 
market expert. In Britain a case is more often than not now heard by a single professional 
judge. A 2011 survey found that the majority of British professional judges (55 per cent) and 
lay judges (98 per cent) broadly agreed with the statement that ‘a three person tribunal is 
likely to have greater legitimacy for parties than a judge sitting alone’ (Corby and Latreille, 
2011).  
 
A further criterion is the litigation rate: the number of claims divided by the working 
population. In Great Britain, the litigation rate is 0.7 per cent, compared to Sweden’s 0.01 per 
cent. This chimes with a study by Knight and Latreille (2000). They found that there were 
less dismissals in unionised British workplaces than in non-union British workplaces, which 
suggests that differences in litigation rates between Britain and Sweden can be explained by 
trade union density and collective bargaining coverage where, as noted above, Sweden scores 
significantly higher than Great Britain.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Comparing labour courts in Great Britain and Sweden, the former is self-service by 
individals. It is up to individual workers whether to help themselves and put in a claim. 
Similarly individuals help themselves and decide whether or not they want to put themselves 
forward as a lay judge, although often a professional judge alone adjudicates without lay 
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judges. In contrast in Sweden, the labour courts are underpinned by collectivism as trade 
unions and employers play a significant part in the adjudicatory system in various ways. They 
seek to resolve disputes by negotiation, before access to the Labour Court. Workers cannot 
take cases themselves, only trade unions can on their behalf (or the DO). As to employers, 
again only employers covered by a collective agreement and/or members of an employer’s 
organisation have access to the Labour Court. Furthermore, employer organisations and trade 
unions provide lay judges; there is no way individuals can directly self-nominate in Sweden 
and Sweden’s lay judges play a part in every adjudication, unlike their British counterparts. 
This paper then sought to evaluate which country had the more effective adjudicatory system 
and found that it depended on the criterion adopted and from whose point of view one was 
judging effectiveness.  
Finally, how do we explain these cross-national differences?  As noted above, legal origin 
theory and varieties of capitalism theory capture differences between Great Britain and 
Sweden and provide possible explanations. This rejected here, however, because they are 
static and do not help us to understand developments over time. Path dependency provides a 
much more plausible explanation (Thelen, 2003; Teague, 2009). It explains the differences 
between the collectivist approach in Sweden’s labour court and the self-service 
individualistic model in Great Britain’s labour courts. Moreover, in its soft version it avoids 
economic determinism and neo-institutional determinism and caters for incremental change, 
which we have seen particularly in Great Britain’s labour courts.  
There is a danger in using path dependency theory to reify institutions and to ignore agency 
and labour courts are creatures of the state. In Sweden, the Social Democratic government 
used an existing institution, its Labour Court, and extended its remit from collective dispute 
resolution to individual dispute resolution. Moreover, despite a change of governing party in 
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2006 from the Social Democrats to an Alliance of centre-right parties and the advancing tide of 
neo-liberalism across Europe, there has been virtually no change in the constitution and 
operation of the Swedish labour court, which remains collectivist, as does the country which 
continues to have relatively high trade union density. Indeed, a recent government inquiry 
into the Swedish courts attested to the high level of confidence in the Labour Court by 
stakeholders and concluded that labour disputes should continue to be heard by the Labour 
Court and not be transferred to the civil courts (Mål och medel, 2010). 
In Great Britain, the government also used an existing institution, an administrative tribunal 
adjudicating individual disputes between a party versus the state, to a body adjudicating party 
versus party employment rights disputes. Since the 1990s governments of different political 
hues have made changes incrementally to the labour court to make them yet more 
individualistic, for instance, by excluding the social partners, curtailing lay judges and 
imposing fees  to mimic the individualistic civil court system.   Accordingly, this paper 
provides an empirical example of  soft path dependency theory,  albeit modified by the thesis 
of Crouch and Farrell (2004), who highlight the role agency and the significance of mimicry. 
As we have shown, governments make changes and when they do so, they do not start from 
scratch; they copy models that are to hand. 
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